Italian heritage II, Meditations

Italian heritage II:

After the DNA test that revealed "Italian-Greek" heritage in our family that we were unaware of, my brother and I offered differing theories on its origin:

1. My theory: There will be DNA of any given population floating around in adjacent populations. If you recombine groups of genes enough times, it's only a matter of statistical probability that some people in the adjacent populations will randomly end up with less than trace amounts of that DNA. I'm still attracted to this theory, but I've always been biased in favor of "systems" explanations.

2. My brother's theory: Two lines of my family lived in New York City (Brooklyn, to be precise) for decades around the turn of the twentieth century. This was the era in which New York City was the destination of a large number of immigrants from Italy. That must be, my brother says, where the Italian ancestry enters our family. His theory has a lot of merit, in that the amount (nine percent, on average) looks roughly like what a great-grandparent would bequeath you (100/8). This is also supported by the fact that my father never knew two of his grandparents: One died giving birth to my grandmother; the other died in the influenza epidemic of 1918 (in Brooklyn). So all the information that might have passed between grandparent and grandchild never had a chance to do so, twice over. 

It seems unlikely to me that we'll ever find out. 

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Meditations, Book IV, Section 17:

If so be that the souls remain after death (say they that will not
believe it); how is the air from all eternity able to contain them? How is the earth (say I) ever from that time able to Contain the bodies of them that are buried? For as here the change and resolution of dead bodies into another kind of subsistence (whatsoever it be;) makes place for other dead bodies: so the souls after death transferred into the air, after they have conversed there a while, are either by way of transmutation, or transfusion, or conflagration, received again into that original rational substance, from which all others do proceed: and so give way to those souls, who before coupled and associated unto bodies, now begin to subsist single. This, upon a supposition that the souls after death do for a while subsist single, may be answered. And here, (besides the number of bodies, so buried and contained by the earth), we may further consider the number of several beasts, eaten by us men, and by other creatures. For notwithstanding that such a multitude of them is daily consumed, and as it were buried in the bodies of the eaters, yet is the same place and body able to contain them, by reason of their conversion, partly into blood, partly into air and fire. What in these things is the speculation of truth? to divide things into that which is passive and material; and that which is active and formal.

Meditations, Book IV, Sections 15 & 16

I got up and was intending to post some Elizabethan sonnets or fourteenth century English poetry on my blog, but then duty called and I got off track. I do intend to steal some time for impractical things today, maybe before I go to bed! 

Meditations, Book IV, sections 15 & 16:

XV. Now much time and leisure doth he gain, who is not curious to know

what his neighbour hath said, or hath done, or hath attempted, but only what he doth himself, that it may be just and holy? or to express it in Agathos' words, Not to look about upon the evil conditions of others, but to run on straight in the line, without any loose and extravagant agitation.

XVI. He who is greedy of credit and reputation after his death, doth
not consider, that they themselves by whom he is remembered, shall soon after every one of them be dead; and they likewise that succeed those; until at last all memory, which hitherto by the succession of men admiring and soon after dying hath had its course, be quite extinct. 

But suppose that both they that shall remember thee, and thy memory with them should be immortal, what is that to thee? I will not say to thee after thou art dead; but even to thee living, what is thy praise? But only for a secret and politic consideration, which we call oikonomian or dispensation. For as for that, that it is the gift of nature, whatsoever is commended in thee, what might be objected from thence, let that now that we are upon another consideration be omitted as unseasonable. That which is fair and goodly, whatsoever it be, and in what respect soever it be, that it is fair and goodly, it is so of itself, and terminates in itself, not admitting praise as a part or member: that therefore which is praised, is not thereby made either better or worse. This I understand even of those things, that are commonly called fair and good, as those which are commended either for the matter itself, or for curious workmanship. As for that which is truly good, what can it stand in need of more than either justice or truth; or more than either kindness and modesty? Which of all those, either becomes good or fair, because commended; or dispraised suffers any damage? Doth the emerald become worse in itself, or more vile if it be not commended? Doth gold, or ivory, or purple? Is there anything that doth though never so common, as a knife, a flower, or a tree?

The meaning of section XVI is not so clear to me. Here's an alternative translation from the Internet Classics Archive, at MIT:

He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal, what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but what is it to the living? What is praise except indeed so far as it has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, clinging to something else...  

Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and works of art. That which is really beautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? Or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?

Meditations, Book IV, Sections 10 to 14

Meditations, Book IV, Sections 10 to 14, from Project Gutenberg. This is really good stuff:

X. These two rules, thou must have always in a readiness. First, do nothing at all, but what reason proceeding from that regal and supreme part, shall for the good and benefit of men, suggest unto thee. And secondly, if any man that is present shall be able to rectify thee or to turn thee from some erroneous persuasion, that thou be always ready to change thy mind, and this change to proceed, not from any respect of any pleasure or credit thereon depending, but always from some probable apparent ground of justice, or of some public good thereby to be furthered; or from some other such inducement. 

XI. Hast thou reason? I have. Why then makest thou not use of it? For if thy reason do her part, what more canst thou require? 

XII. As a part hitherto thou hast had a particular subsistence: and now shalt thou vanish away into the common substance of Him, who first begot thee, or rather thou shalt be resumed again into that original rational substance, out of which all others have issued, and are propagated. Many small pieces of frankincense are set upon the same altar, one drops first and is consumed, another after; and it comes all to one. 

XIII. Within ten days, if so happen, thou shalt be esteemed a god of them, who now if thou shalt return to the dogmata and to the honouring of reason, will esteem of thee no better than of a mere brute, and of an ape. 

XIV. Not as though thou hadst thousands of years to live. Death hangs over thee: whilst yet thou livest, whilst thou mayest, be good.

An alternative translation, from the Internet Classics Archive at MIT. Looking at the alternative translation side by side is really important. It clears up a lot of misunderstanding:

A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one, to do only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation. 

Hast thou reason? I have.- Why then dost not thou use it? For if this does its own work, what else dost thou wish? 

Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which produced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal principle by transmutation. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before, another falls after; but it makes no difference. 

Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship of reason.  

Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.

Meditations, Book IV, Section 9

Meditations, Book IV, Section 9, from Project Gutenberg:

Conceit no such things, as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth, or would have thee to conceive, but look into the matter itself, and see what it is in very truth.

An alternative translation from the MIT Internet Classics Archive:

Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in truth.

Meditations, Book IV, Section 8

Meditations, Book IV, Section 8, from Project Gutenberg:

Whatsoever doth happen in the world, doth happen justly, and so if thou dost well take heed, thou shalt find it. I say not only in right order by a series of inevitable consequences, but according to justice and as it were by way of equal distribution, according to the true worth of everything. Continue then to take notice of it, as thou hast begun, and whatsoever thou dost, do it not without this proviso, that it be a thing of that nature that a good man (as the word good is properly taken) may do it. This observe carefully in every action.

Meditations, Book IV, Section 7

Meditations, Book IV, Section 7, from Project Gutenberg:

Let opinion be taken away, and no man will think himself wronged. If no man shall think himself wronged, then is there no more any such thing as wrong. That which makes not man himself the worse, cannot make his life the worse, neither can it hurt him either inwardly or outwardly. It was expedient in nature that it should be so, and therefore necessary.

Alternative translation, from MIT:

Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and the harm is taken away. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within. The nature of that which is universally useful has been compelled to do this.

Pray for Everyone

Marcus Aurelius, in Section 7 of Book V of Meditations, on praying for everyone:

The form of the Athenians' prayer did run thus: 'O rain, rain, good Jupiter, upon all the grounds and fields that belong to the Athenians.' Either we should not pray at all, or thus absolutely and freely; and not every one for himself in particular alone.

The contrast in this passage is praying for the welfare of oneself versus praying for the benefit of all other farmers in the city. However, when you first read it, not being an Athenian, the mind focuses on that as the controlling category, and it is easy to misinterpret the perspective as praying for the benefit of the political entity to which one belongs to the exclusion of others. A check of other translations shows this latter perspective to be incorrect.